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Abstract 
This paper examines the relation between bank entry restrictions into insurance operations and life insurers’ 
operating efficiency for a sample of 21 European countries over 1995-2003. Controlling for insurance market 
penetration, insurance risk retention, legal environment, and the economic development of the hosting country, we 
document that insurers operate more efficiently in markets with lower bank entry restrictions. Our results suggest 
that financial deregulation has positive spill-over effect, supporting the deregulation efforts in the global financial 
markets.  
Keywords: Bank entry restrictions, Financial deregulation,Operating efficiency,Spill-over effect 
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1. Introduction  
Over the past twenty years, the global trend of financial deregulation and liberalization has had major impact on the 
operations of financial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Banks are traditionally banned from 
engaging in non-banking services such as cross-selling insurance products, real estate management, and securities 
underwriting. Following deregulation, banks have greatly expanded their products and services and have been 
competing with brokers, investment banking firms, and insurance companies. Economics theory predicts 
competition within an industry enhances efficiency and prevents monopolistic behavior. There is scant research 
examining the cross-industry regulation effect. To the best of our knowledge, Carow (2001) is the only empirical 
research that addresses this topic in the financial industry. Building on theory of contestable markets (Baumol, 1982; 
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1983), he hypothesizes that when banks are permitted by law to offer insurance 
services; the incumbent insurers are less likely to extract economic rents. Given that stock price is the discounted 
value of future cash flow, he predicts and documents a negative stock price reaction of insurance companies to the 
Supreme Court Rulings that allow banks to sell insurance products.  
We extend Carow (2001) by testing the effect of bank regulation on insurers’ efficiency using a cross country panel 
dataset. We use the bank activity index from World Bank banking supervision database as a proxy of the stringency 
of bank regulation. This index has three components measuring the restrictiveness of bank activities in the areas of 
(1) security underwriting; (2) insurance underwriting and selling, and (3) real estate investment. In this paper, we 
focus on area (2). We hypothesize that the degree of restriction on banks’ insurance operations should have an 
adverse effect on insurance market competition which leads to less efficient operations of incumbent insurers. To 
test this hypothesis, we assemble the aggregate life insurers’ operating performance data and banking market 
regulations information for a sample of 21 European countries over 1995-2003. We document higher operating 
efficiency in markets with less bank entry restrictions. Moreover, markets that raise bank entry restrictions 
experience a negative change in operating efficiency for life insurers. As a robustness check, we also explore the 
relation between the composite bank activity index (i.e. the restrictions in all three areas as mentioned above) and 
life insurers operating performance and find similar support for our view.  
We contribute to literature in two ways. First, we provide additional empirical evidence in support of the theory of 
contestable markets. Previous studies in this area focus on banking market. Our research is the first using a large 
cross country insurance dataset. Second, we join a growing body of research that explores the benefits of 
bank-insurance structure by documenting efficiency gains to insurers by lowering entry restrictions to banks. Our 
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findings support the policy initiatives aiming at lowering entry barriers to competition, thus to enhance efficiency 
and increase welfare of consumers. The spill-over effect documented in our study also has strong policy 
implications. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related research and hypotheses development; 
Section 3 describes our sample and variable constructions. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Related Research and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Barriers for Entry to Banks and Insurance Market Competition 
Carow (2001) examines U.S.bank and insurance companies’ stock price reactions to the Supreme Court rulings 
allowing banks to sell annuities and other insurance products and finds no significant changes in bank stock price 
and negative changes in insurance stock price. He focuses on the application of the theory of contestable markets in 
the insurance market. (Note 1) The main argument of the contestable market theory is that market can be contestable 
with a small group of incumbents with low entry barrier which creates “hit and run” opportunities. Banks are more 
adapt at offering products in the life and health insurance areas. As such, he shows that life and health insurance 
companies experienced most significant stock market losses following the Supreme Court rulings. Moreover,Carow 
(2001) shows that insurers wealth losses to these rulings are also related to the distribution methods, i.e., do they 
directly underwrite the insurance products, or use exclusive agents, independent agents, or brokers. Banks are most 
likely to use insurance brokers to underwrite these products. As such, insurers that use the broker distribution 
method are least affected by these court rulings.To our knowledge, Carow (2001) is the only empirical study that 
tests the impact of bank entry restrictions on insurers’ performance.  
With the passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (1999),commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms, 
and insurance companies compete more aggressively against each other. Outside the U.S., Europe in particular, the 
practice of the universal banking encourages banks and the insurers both compete and cooperate. Bancassurance, i.e., 
marketing insurance products and services via bank networks becomes a very popular means of insurance 
distribution in several European markets such as France, Italy, Spain and Portugual (Legrand 2008). Empirical 
evidence suggests that merging bank and insurance business provides diversification benefits (Brown, Genetay &M 
olyneux, 1996; Genetay & Molyneux, 1998; Lown, Osler, Strahan & Sufi, 2000; Nurullah & Staikouras, 2008; Deng  
& Elyasiani, 2008). Others document efficiency gains through the bancassurance  structure (Fields, Fraser & Kolari, 
2007a, b). Studies also stock market reactions to the announcements of bank-insurance deals (Fields, Fraser & 
Kolari, 2007a, b; Chen, Li, Moshirian & Tan, 2007; Staikouras, 2009). We add to this strand of literature by 
exploring the efficiency gains in the insurance sector by lowering bank entry restrictions into insurance operations. 
2.2 Financial Deregulation in Europe  
The European financial market began its major deregulation efforts in the 1980s. Aiming at creating a common 
market for insurance, the European Union (EU) initiated a series of reforms including the first and second insurance 
directives, passed between 1973 and 1990 and the third generation insurance directives in 1994. The single passport 
proposal was adopted which permits insurance companies to offer EU wide services through a branch office upon 
approval by the local regulatory authority. Consumers are free to purchase insurance from any insurer based in the 
EU. These reforms lead to a major wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the European markets. ((Note 
2)Rees and Kessner (1999) examine the impact of a series of insurance directives aiming at harmonizing European 
insurance markets. They argue that these initiatives do not have the intended effect of stimulating competition across 
borders until there is a set of unified insurance laws across these markets. Prior research show mixed results on 
efficiency gains of consolidation in the financial services industry (Berger and Humphrey 1997). Berger (2003) 
conducts a research review on the efficiency effects of a single financial services market in Europe. He finds that the 
creation of a single market is unlikely to result in strong efficiency gains.Hussels, and Ward (2004) document an 
efficiency improvement in German life insurance industry post the adoption of the third Generation Insurance 
Directive. Cummings and Rubio-Misas (2001) examine the effects of deregulation and consolidation in Spanish 
insurance industry (1989 ~ 1998). As a result of major consolidations, the number of insurers declined significantly 
− small, inefficient, and financially under-performing firms were eliminated through liquidation. However, they also 
find that some large insurers still operate inefficiently. 
Research reviewed above focus on the direct impact of financial regulation on either banks or insurance companies 
with the exception of Carow (2001), we extend his research by testing the spill-over effect of banking regulation on 
insurers using a large cross-country panel dataset. Our main hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
www.ccsenet.org/ijef              International Journal of Economics and Finance              Vol. 4, No. 4; April 2012 
Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education 57
Hypothesis I: restrictions on insurance operations by banks are inversely correlated with the efficiency of insurance 
companies. 
Finding support for this view would be consistent with the theory of contestable markets. Moreover, we conjecture 
that insurance companies operate more efficiently following a decrease in banking regulations. 
3. Data and Variable Construction 
3.1 Sample 
We assemble country-level life insurers’ net premium, operation expenses, insurance market penetration, and risk 
retention ratio for a set of 21 European countries from 1995 to 2003 using Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) bank profitability and insurance statistics database. (Note 3) Our measure of bank entry 
barrier is based on the bank activity index from the bank regulation and supervision surveys conducted by the World 
Bank. (Note 4) This survey contains a set of three bank activity regulatory variables measuring the extent to which 
banks are permitted to engage in underwriting and selling (1) securities; (2) insurance; (3) real estate; In this study, 
we focus bank activity regulations in area (2) and construct a variable Insure index which takes on integer values of 
1 ~ 4 indicating four levels of restrictiveness: 
Insure =1: Unrestricted - A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted directly in the bank. 
Insure =2: Permitted - A full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must be conducted in 
subsidiaries. 
Insure =3: Restricted - Less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries. 
Insure =4: Prohibited - The activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries. 
The first World Bank regulation and supervision survey covers 117 countries between 1998 and 2000. (Note 5) It 
also updated this data in 2003 and 2008 respectively. Since our OECD insurance statistics database ends in 2003, the 
final sample is the intersection of these two data sources. Our final sample is unbalanced and consists of 169 country 
year observations from 1995 to 2003. The bank activity index thus contains the original World Bank survey and the 
2003 update information. See Appendix A: Distribution of Insurer Index by Country for time period 1(1995-1999 
survey I) and 2 (2000 – 2003 survey II).  
3.2 Regression Model 
We use the standard panel data estimation technique — a country fixed effect model specified as follows (Equation 
(1) & (2)).(Note 6) See Appendix B for variable definitions. 
OE ൌ β଴ ൅ βଵInsure ൅ βଶPenetration ൅ βଷRetention ൅ βସLaw ൅ βହLogሺGDPpercapሻ ൅ ε               ሺ1ሻ 
OE ൌ β଴ ൅ βଵInsure_H ൅ βଶPenetration ൅ βଷRetention ൅ βସLaw ൅ βହLogሺGDPpercapሻ ൅ ε             ሺ2ሻ 
3.2.1 Operating Expense Ratio (OE) 
Our measure of insurance market operating efficiency is the total operating expenses tonet premium ratio. High 
OE  indicates low operating efficiency.  
3.2.2 Insure Index ( Insure, Insure_H)  
Our primary variable of interest is Insure Index as described in section 3.1. We also include a binary variable 
Insure_H (Equation 2) to account for possible non-linear effect of bank regulation. Insure_H is set to 1 if a country’s 
insure index is above median and zero. A positive and significant coefficient (βଵ) supports our hypothesis.  
3.2.3 Market Penetration (Penetration) 
Market penetration is the ratio of a nation’s gross insurance premiums to its gross domestic product (GDP) ratio. It 
captures the relative importance of the insurance industry in the domestic economy. We expect that insurers operate 
more efficiently in more developed insurance markets, i.e., a negative and significant coefficient (βଶ) is expected.  
3.2.4 Retention Ratio (Retention) 
Cummins and VanDerhei (1979) find a significant positive relationship between riskretention and expense ratio for 
the insurance companies. We use the ratio of net written premiums to total gross premiums to measure the 
proportion of retained business and expect a positive and significant coefficient (βଷ).   
3.2.5 Rule of Law (Law) 
La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) first introduce the significant role of legal environments in the development of 
financial system and markets. Markets with strong shareholder and creditor protections should be able to allocate 
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capital more efficiently. Hussels et al. (2005) discuss the importance of Legal systems in facilitating insurance 
demand and affect insurance company’s insolvency. We include the rule of law factor (Kaufmann et al., 2008) and 
predict a negative coefficient on this variable. (Note 6) 
3.2.6 Economic Development (LogሺGDPሻ) 
We use the log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita to control for the effect of economic development. 
Prior insurance literature shows a non-linear relationship between economic development and insurance penetration 
− insurance penetration initially rises with the GDP. After the GDP reaches a certain level, penetration plateaus. 
There exists no direct evidence on the relationship between insurance efficiency and GDP per capita. We predict a 
negative coefficient on this variable, i.e. a positive relationship between economic development and insurers’ 
operating efficiency.  
4. Empirical Results and Discussions 
Below we first present the time trend plot of European insurance market development, followed by some descriptive 
statistics, univariate tests, and regression results.  
4.1 Time Trend Plot 
Figure 1 presents the time trend plots of life insurance penetration by insurance index for the full sample. It appears 
both high and low insurance index countries experienced significant growth in insurance penetration up to year 2000. 
This is the period leading up to the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union of Europe. Low insurance 
index markets have much higher insurance penetration compared to their counterparts.  
To further explore the impact of Insure index on insurance market efficiency, we examine the subsets of markets 
that experienced either an increase or a decrease in bank activity restriction (insure index risers vs. decliners). Our 
full sample contains 169 country year observations. About 1/3 of the sample experienced no change in bank 
insurance regulations based on World Bank supervision and regulation survey 1 & 2 results. We have 112 country 
year observations that had either an increase or decrease in Insure index. From this subsample, we construct two 
groups − index risers, i.e. markets that raisedinsure index in survey 2 period; and indexdecliners, i.e. markets that 
lowered insure index in survey 2 period. Using these two groups, Figure 2 plots the time trend of their respective 
operating expense ratio. We identify a steady increase in operating expense ratio for index risers. By contrast, index 
decliners exhibit lower operating expense ratio post 1999. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that 
lowering bank entry barriers promote competition. As such, the incumbent insurers are forced to operate more 
efficiently.  
4.2 Univariate Results  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. Table 2 presents the results of the test of mean differences of between high 
and low Insureindex markets. It shows that life insurers operate significantly less efficiently in high Insure index 
markets. These results are consistent with previous trend plots and provide some preliminary support for our 
hypothesis that operating efficiency of insurers is positively related to market openness to bank entry. 
4.3 Regression Results 
Table 3 presents country fixed effect regression results. The coefficient estimates with t-statistics have been adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity as in White (1980). As predicted, equations (1) and (2) both show a positive coefficient on 
insure index, however, it is only significant for the binary variable, suggesting that the effect of bank regulation on 
insurance performance may be non-linear. (Note 7) Similar to Cummins and VanDerhei (1979), we also find a 
significant and positive relationship between risk retention and expense. In addition, we find a significant and 
negative relationship between the rule of law and operating expense, consistent with Sylvester et al. (2005) showing 
law enforcement as a determinant of insurance market effectiveness. The negative coefficient on the log of GDP per 
capita supports the view that developed financial markets have more efficient insurance operations, ceteris paribus.  
4.4 Robustness Check  
As a robustness check, we replace the insurer index with the overall banking activity index (OVER3AR). This index 
measures restiveness on banking operations in areas of (1) security underwriting; (2) insurance underwriting and 
selling, and (3) real estate investment. High OVER3AR indicates banks have less flexibility in diversifying and 
competing in the non-traditional banking areas. Our hypothesis is supported using this variable.    
5. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper examinesthe spill-over effect of regulation on banks’ insurance underwriting and selling activities on 
insurers’ performance. Using a sample of 169 country year panel data set from 21 European nations, we show that 
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markets with higher levels of restrictions on banks’ insurance activities have lower insurance operating efficiency. 
Second, markets that raised restrictions on banking activities experience significant drop in operating efficiency. 
Together, these findings support the contestable markets theory – low entry barriers encourage hit and run new 
entrants to compete with incumbents, as a result, incumbents are unable to earn economic rents in the long run. Our 
finding has important policy implications – regulators need to consider the “spill-over” effect when design and 
implement new rules and regulations. 
Our study has a few limitations. Due to data limitations, our tests are conducted on a country wide basis rather than 
at individual firm level. Even though we document statisticalsignificance for our key variables, these results do not 
imply causality.Our sample period overlaps with the major deregulation insurance initiatives in the European 
markets. As discussed in section 2, prior research has examined the topic of consolidation and efficiency in the 
financial services industries and document mixed results. We do not directly control for the effect of consolidation 
due to data unavailability given that the major regulatory developments affect all of our sample markets.    
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Notes 
Note 1. The theory of contestable marketsholds that markets can be competitiveeven in the presence of a small 
number of firms as long as the entry barrier is low. In that case, incumbents cannot earn economic rents in the face 
of “hit and run” entrants.  
Note 2. Cummins and Weiss (2004) document a total of 2,595 M&As involving European insurers between 1990 
and 2002. 
Note 3. OECD members include countries outside Europe continent. We restrict our analysis to EU countries 
considering these markets are more homogeneous to each other than those outside Europe. For example, Australia, 
Japan, and Korea are OECD members, but they are not included in our analyses. 
Note 4. See Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2001) for more discussions on 
this data. 
Note 5. Most data was collected as of 1999. 
The Hausman test statistics indicates fixed country effect is more appropriate than random effect mode. 
Note 6. Kaufmann et al. (2008) developed a series of six governance indicators that examine the effect of legal and 
government factors on a nation’s financial market development. Their Worldwide Governance Indicators include: (1) 
voice and accountability, (2) political stability, (3) absence of violence, (4) government effectiveness, (5) rule of law 
and (6) regulatory quality. Sylvester et al (2005) noted law enforcement as a factor leading to insurance market 
effectiveness. Hence, we chose the rule of law factor rather than the other governance factors to be included in our 
efficiency model. The correlation analysis also indicates these six factors are highly correlated. 
Note 7. We run regression with a quadratic term of insure index and find a positive coefficient for the quadratic term. 
This suggests that the adverse impact of restriction on bank operations on insurers performance starts after the insure 
index reaches a certain level. 
 
  
